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One of the principal dangers currently facing the world economy 
arises from the large and unsustainable imbalances in current 
account  positions.  Some  observers  argue  that  these  imbal-
ances will unwind gradually and nondisruptively, while others 
emphasize the risks of a sudden change of sentiment in financial 
markets that could result in an abrupt and damaging adjustment. 
No one knows which scenario will materialize, but a priority 
for policymakers should be to reduce the risks of a crisis, which 
could produce a world recession and disruptions to the global 
trading system. For that, the global economy requires official 
sponsorship of a credible, comprehensive adjustment program. 
This policy brief outlines such a program.
Section 1 presents why the current situation is unsustain-
able. Adjustment must take place and will require significant 
movements in exchange rates. Section 2 argues that adjustment 
induced by policy actions is more likely to be orderly than one 
initiated by financial markets. We view the current stalemate 
regarding policy actions as dangerous, as financial-market partic-
ipants are likely to change their minds at some stage about the 
sustainability of imbalances unless they see that the main players 
are able to agree on the direction of desirable policy changes. 
Section 3 presents estimates of the exchange rate implications 
of global current account adjustment from a variety of models. 
Section 4 describes the policy implications the authors of this 
brief drew from these results and the workshop discussions.
 	
WHY THE CURRENT SITUATION 
IS UNSUSTAINABLE
There has been a great deal of discussion recently of global current 
account imbalances. Much of the attention has focused on the 
historically large US current account deficit, which, according to 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, reached $857 billion (6.5 
percent of GDP) in 2006. The counterpart to this deficit can be 
found mainly in Asia and the oil-exporting countries. Accord-
ing to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s surplus 
swelled to an estimated $184 billion (7.2 percent of GDP) in 
2006,1 while Japan recorded an estimated surplus of $167 billion 
(3.7 percent of GDP) last year. High oil prices propelled the 
surplus for countries in the Middle East to $282 billion last 
year. 
1. This estimate appears conservative. China’s trade surplus in goods was $178 
billion in 2006, with imports reported on a cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f) basis. 
When the import data are adjusted to free on board (f.o.b.), the trade in goods 
surplus will likely come in at about $215 billion. Based on trends in the other 
items in the first-half balance of payments, Nicholas Lardy estimates that China’s 
surplus last year was $240 billion (see Nicholas Lardy,  Toward a Consumption-
Driven Growth Path, Policy Briefs in International Economics PB06-6, Washing-
ton: Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2006).N u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 4   m a r c h  2 0 0 7
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There was broad agreement among the workshop partici-
pants on a number of points. First, as a result of the increase 
in global financial integration over the last decade or so, larger 
and more persistent current account imbalances are possible 
for many countries today than they were in the past. Global 
capital markets are larger and more liquid, and new financial 
instruments have developed that make it easier for investors 
to manage risk. What effect financial globalization and the 
proliferation of derivative instruments has had on the prob-
ability of a smooth unwinding of global imbalances is an open 
question. 
Second, the United States is presently deriving significant 
benefits from the situation. Financial inflows from abroad have 
boosted US asset prices and helped to keep US long-term inter-
est rates low, thereby spurring and financing domestic spend-
ing in the United States. In addition, it is well known that the 
return on US gross foreign assets exceeds that on US gross 
foreign liabilities. The effect is that, although US net foreign 
liabilities exceed 20 percent of GDP, net income payments on 
these liabilities are small.2 Moreover, because foreign claims on 
the United States are almost entirely priced or denominated 
in dollars, while US direct and portfolio equity assets abroad 
as well as a portion of credit claims on foreigners are priced 
or denominated in foreign currency, the decline in the foreign 
2. In fact, despite continuously rising net foreign liabilities, income receipts on 
US-owned assets abroad were greater than income payments on foreign-owned 
assets in the United States until the fourth quarter of 2005.
exchange value of the dollar over recent years has boosted 
the dollar equivalent of foreign assets, thereby reducing US 
net foreign liabilities as measured in dollars. As a result, the 
increase in US net foreign liabilities over the past few years 
has  been  considerably  smaller  than  the  cumulative  current 
account deficits.3  
 Nevertheless, the current pattern of global imbalances is 
not sustainable. Medium-term projections by the IMF indicate 
that at unchanged real effective exchange rates, large current 
account imbalances will persist (see figure 1). Persistent exter-
nal deficits and surpluses of this scale imply an implausible 
accumulation  of  foreign  liabilities  on  the  US  side  and  an 
implausible accumulation of assets on the Chinese and Japa-
nese sides. The implied steep increase in US net foreign liabili-
ties (figure 2) from about 8 percent of world GDP (26 percent 
of US GDP) in 2006 to roughly 15 percent of world GDP 
(over 51 percent of US GDP) by 2011 raises serious questions 
about the willingness of foreign investors to continue accumu-
lating net claims on the United States, especially considering 
that gross foreign holdings of US assets would be far larger. 
At some stage, foreign investors will begin to demand ever 
higher returns on the US assets that they buy, though where 
that limit might be is impossible to tell at this point. 
3. For comprehensive data on the valuation effects, see Philip Lane and Gian . For comprehensive data on the valuation effects, see Philip Lane and Gian 
Maria Milesi-Ferretti, The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and 
Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970-2004, IMF Working 
Papers 06/69 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2006).
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The  clear  implication  is  that  global  current  account 
adjustment must take place. The most elementary theory tells 
us that this adjustment will require movements in exchange 
rates, including a significant depreciation in the dollar and 
corresponding appreciations in the currencies of other coun-
tries, as well as a rebalancing of demand and saving across the 
globe.4
WHAT ADJUSTMENT? 
A key question is whether financial markets or policy actions 
will initiate the necessary and inevitable adjustment. Market 
sentiment can change abruptly and the risk of a market-led 
adjustment is that it might involve global recession, abrupt 
and excessive changes in key exchange rates and asset prices, 
and as a consequence aggravated trade frictions. To reduce 
the risk of such an outcome, policymakers need to initiate a 
policy-induced adjustment in the near future. The recent vola-
tility in global financial markets is a reminder of the dangers of 
failing to act promptly. 
Agreement on the substance of a policy-induced adjust-
ment is the purpose of the multilateral consultations at the 
IMF initiated in 2006. However, they have not yet achieved 
significant results. Meanwhile, the United States is focusing on 
4. See, for example, Maurice Obstfeld and �enneth �ogoff, Global Current . See, for example, Maurice Obstfeld and �enneth �ogoff, Global Current 
Account Imbalances and Exchange �ate Adjustments, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 1:  67–146 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2005).
its bilateral relationship with China, and the Europeans have 
been getting vocal about the yen. Yet the issue of adjustment 
has a multilateral character; thus, a multilateral institution 
or forum, such as the one convened by the IMF or possibly 
an informal Group of Four (United States, euro area or the 
European Union, Japan, and China), would seem to be the 
appropriate venue to deal with it.
There is a large degree of convergence in the economic 
interest of the key players:
•    The United States needs to bring its current account defi-
cit down to an acceptable level, and this will require a 
significant effective depreciation of the dollar and higher 
US national saving.
•     China needs to curb its accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves,  rebalance  growth  toward  domestic  demand, 
and continue removing distortions that favor exporting 
industries. 
•  Although Japan’s weak exchange rate and ultra low inter-
est rates have been instrumental in countering deflation, 
economic recovery now permits the return of monetary 
policy and the exchange rate to a more neutral stance. 
•  Europe’s currencies have already appreciated substantially 
both against the dollar and in effective terms. For Euro-
peans, the priority is to avoid an overshooting of their 
currencies that might result from a disorderly adjustment. 
However, it is important to recognize that an effective 
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depreciation of the dollar and an effective appreciation 
of the Asian currencies imply a further bilateral apprecia-
tion of the euro and sterling against the dollar. Other-
wise, there would be an effective depreciation of the euro 
and sterling, eroding the extent of potential US external 
adjustment.
•  The �orean won, like the European currencies, has already 
appreciated sharply both against the dollar and in effective 
terms. If �orea’s current account remains in small surplus 
as projected by the IMF, then its currency would need 
to appreciate further against the dollar in the context of 
global adjustment. If instead its current account swings 
toward significant deficit in 2007–08, as is being forecast 
by some �orean institutions, then more limited apprecia-
tion against the dollar and corresponding partial reversal 
of the trade-weighted appreciation experienced to date 
could be appropriate.5
•  Several key oil-exporting countries have adopted a more 
prudent and forward-looking approach than they did in 
the 1970s and 1980s and are likely to build their stocks 
of foreign assets further. In other words, these countries’ 
marginal propensity to spend out of oil revenues is less 
than  one.  However,  their  surpluses  need  to  decline  as 
domestic absorption gradually expands.
In spite of this potential convergence of interest, the main 
participants have not embarked on a set of policies that clearly 
signal their intention to tackle the global imbalances. This 
stalemate is dangerous, and it is imprudent to delay a change 
in stance until financial markets conclude that the present 
situation is unsustainable.6 Of particular concern already are
•  the trade frictions between China and the United States 
arising from China’s exchange rate policy and 
•  the weakness of the yen. Although it has strengthened 
moderately recently, it remains very weak on a histori-
cal basis. This weakness not only contributes to the US 
trade deficit but also hurts other economies in Asia that 
have suffered a loss of competitiveness against Japan. Yen-
funded carry trades may have begun to unwind, but any 
rebound in the amount of such trades may weaken the 
yen again. A weaker yen would not be consistent with 
5.  See Economic Forecasting for 2007 (�orea Development Institute, De-
cember 2006) and 2007 Economic Forecasting  (Samsung Economic �esearch 
Institute, November 2006).
6. Paul �rugman, “Will There Be a Dollar Crisis?” Paper presented at the 
Economic Policy Panel at the Federal �eserve Bank of New York, February 12, 
2007, available at www.cepr.org.
         the  ongoing recovery in Japan’s economy and accompany-
ing prospective tightening of Japanese monetary policy. 
ADJUSTMENT SCENARIOS
 
To examine what a return to sustainability might mean for 
exchange rates, participants in the workshop were asked to 
present estimates of the exchange rate implications of current 
account adjustment scenarios in which the US current account 
deficit narrowed to 3 percent of GDP in the medium term. 
The scenarios differ in how the burden of adjustment is shared 
among individual countries in the rest of the world, but all 
scenarios assume that most of the adjustment would be borne 
by China, Japan, other Asian economies, a few high-surplus 
European economies not in the euro area, and the oil-export-
ing countries. The external balance of the euro area, which is 
projected to be in slight deficit in 2007, is assumed unchanged. 
An important goal behind all scenarios is that the adjustment 
should take place without depressing the rate of growth of 
world GDP. 
Three approaches were used to assess those implications:
•    Partial	 equilibrium	 “trade	 elasticities”	 models:  The 
Baily model of US trade performance, the Cline model 
of optimal exchange rate realignment, and the Stolper 
and Fuentes elasticity model are in this tradition.7 So are 
the  macroeconomic  balance  and  external  sustainability 
approaches outlined in the IMF (2006) review of meth-
odologies for equilibrium exchange rate assessment.8
•    Macroeconomic	models: The NiGEM model estimates 
prepared by Barrell, Holland, and Hurst are in this tradi-
tion, as are the Federal �eserve estimates with a dynamic 
general  equilibrium  model  referred  to  by  Christopher 
Erceg.9
•    Reduced-form	 estimates	 of	 equilibrium	 exchange	
rates: The Bénassy-Quéré, Lahrèche-�évil, and Mignon 
estimates, and those by Stolper and Fuentes using the 
Goldman  Sachs  dynamic  equilibrium  exchange  rate 
(GSDEE�) model and by MacDonald and Dias using the 
7. See papers presented at the workshop by Martin Baily, “Dollar Adjustment 
to �educe the US Imbalance”; William �. Cline, “Estimating �eference 
Exchange �ates”; and Thomas Stolper and Monica Fuentes, “GSDEE� and 
Trade Elasticities.”
8. See paper presented at the workshop by Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, “Meth- . See paper presented at the workshop by Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, “Meth- Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, “Meth- “Meth-
odologies for CGE� Exchange �ate Assessments” (International Monetary 
Fund, November 8, 2006).
9. See paper presented at the workshop by �ay Barrell, Dawn Holland, and 
Ian Hurst, “Correcting US Imbalances.” The results presented by Christopher 
Erceg are based on the Federal �eserve Board’s SIGMA model. For more 
details on SIGMA, see www.ijcb.org.N u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 4   m a r c h  2 0 0 7
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behavioural equilibrium exchange rate (BEE�) model, 
  are in this family.10 So is the equilibrium real exchange 
rate approach described in the IMF (2006) paper.
Box 1 describes in more detail the models and approaches 
used  in  the  workshop  papers.  Table  1  contains  estimates 
presented at the workshop of the changes in the real effective 
exchange rates of the main currencies required to meet the 
objectives for a reduced US current account deficit.11 Table 2 
10. See papers presented by Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, Amina Lahrèche-�évil, 
and Valérie Mignon, “World Consistent Equilibrium Exchange �ates”; and by 
�onald MacDonald and Preèthike Dias, “BEE� Estimates and Target Current 
Account Imbalances.” 
11. We exclude from the comparisons estimates that do not meet the specifica- . We exclude from the comparisons estimates that do not meet the specifica-
tions of the scenario. Estimates from Bénassy-Quéré, Lahrèche-�évil, and 
Mignon, as well as those of the GSDEE� approach of Stolper and Fuentes, 
did not examine what exchange rate changes would be required to meet the 
3 percent of GDP target for the US current account deficit specified in the 
presents the equivalent changes in bilateral real exchange rates 
against the US dollar. Markets tend to focus on this figure, 
but it is the wrong figure in determining the extent of the 
economic effects of exchange rate changes. The average (i.e., 
effective) exchange rate movements shown in table 1 are of 
far greater importance, because they are what determine the 
change in trade outcomes for each country. They also tend 
to be much smaller, for the fundamental economic reason 
that many countries are postulated to be appreciating their 
exchange rates against the dollar simultaneously.
workshop terms of reference. Both found surprisingly that the dollar was 
undervalued, implying that those models find financial markets to be comfort-
able with a persistent US current account deficit much higher than this target, 
at least for an extremely long period.  Both models are subject to the possible 
problems noted in box 1 (third approach).  Moreover, the alternative elastici-
ties model estimated by Stolper and Fuentes produced results more in line 
with those of the other papers.  
Box 1   Models and approaches
Workshop paper authors applied three broad modeling approaches to investigate equilibrium exchange rates. The most tradi-
tional approach was the partial equilibrium “trade elasticities” method in conjunction with judgmental current account targets. 
In this approach, exports and imports depend on the price incentive provided by the real effective exchange rate and on the 
impact of foreign income on demand for exports and of domestic income on demand for imports. The more complete models 
in this genre include detailed treatment of foreign asset and liability changes and rates of return. These models examine the 
magnitude of the exchange rate change needed to shift the current account from baseline to target levels. A strength of this 
approach is its transparency. It does, of course, require a judgment about the size of the current account deficit that is sustain-
able. There is no explicit modeling of how an exchange rate change is to be achieved (under floating rates). A limitation is that it 
does not attempt specific modeling of how the corresponding change in absorption is composed (higher private saving, lower 
public dissaving, and/or less investment). 
The second approach is to shock a macroeconometric model in such a way that it generates a targeted change in the 
current account over a certain horizon. In principle, a strength of this approach is that it takes into account feedback effects 
and explicitly incorporates the monetary and fiscal policies needed to generate a desired shock. An important limitation is 
the underlying return-to-equilibrium structure of the model, which typically assumes the economy begins in equilibrium and 
therefore after a shock returns to the same starting point over time from feedback effects. However, the normal policy-feedback 
rules (such as a “Taylor rule” for monetary policy) that characterize such models are inappropriate when the economy starts in 
a disequilibrium requiring a policy change. This class of models also provides considerably less transparency than the partial 
equilibrium models in attributing the calculated changes in outcomes to specific changes in the model inputs. 
The third approach is econometric modeling of the influences that are found internationally to be associated with strong 
or weak real exchange rates, including such variables as net foreign assets and productivity growth. In this approach, the 
coefficients estimated from international experience are applied to the country in question to determine whether its exchange 
rate is overvalued or undervalued and by how much. A major limitation of this approach is that it must assume not only that 
the period observed is one in which on average the countries in the sample are at equilibrium exchange rates but also that 
the overall coefficients estimated for the panel of countries apply to the country of direct interest (e.g., the United States). A 
related limitation is that there is no explicit attention to erosion or improvement of a country’s relative position over time from 
factors not directly in the model, such as the secular adverse shift for the United States implied by Martin Baily’s findings. There 
are difficulties in measurement, such as the use of consumer to producer price ratios to proxy productivity, thereby potentially 
placing what amounts to the real exchange rate on both sides of the equation. There are also difficulties of policy interpreta-
tion, such as the result in the IMF model indicating that a larger fiscal deficit is associated with a stronger real exchange rate, 
even though running a larger fiscal deficit is not a sustainable means of achieving equilibrium.N u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 4   m a r c h  2 0 0 7
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•  In  principle,  the  extent  of  exchange  rate  adjustment 
depends on the underlying factors behind surpluses or 
deficits and on what policy actions are taken. Also, as the 
US deficit shrinks, the assumed distribution of the adjust-
ment across the rest of the world matters. Specifically, the 
greater the share of the adjustment that a country under-
takes through a decline in its current account balance, 
the larger the required appreciation of that country’s real 
effective exchange rate. 
•  The models generally find that a real effective deprecia-
tion of the dollar of between 10 and 20 percent from the 
current level is needed to shrink the US current account 
deficit to 3 percent of GDP over the next few years. 
•  To reduce the Japanese current account surplus to levels 
specified in the scenarios (that is, to between $36 billion 
and $54 billion, depending on the scenario, from $167 
billion in 2006), the models typically find that a real effec-
tive appreciation in the yen of between 10 and 15 percent 
is needed. This movement requires a 25 to 30 percent 
real appreciation of the yen vis-à-vis the dollar, moving 
the exchange rate to around 90 yen/dollar compared with 
roughly 118 yen/dollar today.12 
12. The implied yen/dollar figure assumes that most of the required move-
ment in the real bilateral exchange rate comes about through a change in the 
nominal exchange rate. 
•  The workshop produced a fairly wide range of estimates 
for the required movement in the Chinese renminbi. This 
uncertainty  in  part  reflects  the  difficulty  of  estimating 
precisely the sensitivity of Chinese exports and imports 
to exchange rate movements.13 Effective appreciation of Effective appreciation of 
between 5 and 25 percent was calculated to be required 
to reduce China’s surplus by between roughly 3.5 and 
6.5 percentage points of GDP (with the low end of the 
range being accompanied by an expansion of domestic 
demand in China that more than compensated for the 
loss of foreign demand). As in the case of the Japanese As in the case of the Japanese 
currency, this strengthening of the renminbi in effective 
terms implies a substantially larger bilateral appreciation 
against the dollar. 
•  Since the scenarios assume a roughly unchanged current 
account deficit in the euro area, little or no change in the 
effective value of the euro is needed. As the models find 
that the euro depreciates against the Asian currencies, a 
stable effective euro implies a marked bilateral apprecia-
13. The time series of data on Chinese exports and imports is relatively short. 
In addition, the enormous structural changes that the Chinese economy has 
undergone over the past decade complicate econometric estimates of China’s 
trade elasticities. Generally, the more sensitive to exchange rate movements 
that China’s trade is estimated to be, the less appreciation of the renminbi is 
needed.   
Table 1   Real effective exchange rate change required to reduce US current account 
                   deficit to 3 percent  of GDP in the medium term (percent change)
Author US dollar Japanese yen Chinese renminbi Euro
Martin Baily –1 to –0 n.e. n.e n.e.
Ray Barrell, Dawn Holland,  
and Ian Hurst
–11 to –19 +10 to +1 + to +7 – to +6
William R. Clinea –18 +8 to +18 +9 to + 0
Thomas Stolper
and Monica Fuentesb
–16 +18 + +
Ronald MacDonald 
and Preèthike Dias
–11d +6 +7 0
Christopher Ercegc –8 to – n.e. n.e. n.e.
n.e.  = not estimated
a. January–August 006 average. Range refers to two model variants applied to the three scenarios considered 
     by the workshop. 
b. Only results from the elasticity model reported. 
c. Range refers to the different shocks that are being unwound. 
d. Using preferred coefficient estimate.
 
Note: + implies appreciation; – implies depreciationN u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 4   m a r c h  2 0 0 7
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tion of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar to between $1.45 and 
$1.50 per euro compared with about $1.33 today.
To summarize, the model estimates presented at the work-
shop placed the order of magnitude of effective depreciation 
of the dollar needed to bring about the targeted adjustment 
at around 15 percent. Effective appreciations of around 10 
percent for the yen and 15 percent for the renminbi would 
provide part of the counterpart. To bring about these effec-
tive exchange rate movements, much larger bilateral appre-
ciations against the dollar would be required, of maybe 25 to 
30 percent for the yen and 30 percent for the renminbi. But 
there will also be a need for substantial bilateral appreciations 
against the dollar by currencies whose effective exchange rates 
do not need to change. In particular, the euro would need to 
strengthen to at least $1.45 per euro, while sterling would rise 
to well over $2 per pound.
Finally, although the primary focus of the workshop was 
on the currencies of countries taking part in the IMF multilat-
eral talks, currencies of other economies running large external 
surpluses would also need to appreciate on an effective basis 
in order to meet the targets for correcting global imbalances 
specified in the workshop scenarios. Otherwise US external 
adjustment would fall below target. The combined role of the 
smaller surplus economies in Asia and Europe (outside of the 
euro area) in the adjustment process will be more important 
than either China or Japan.14 This consideration illustrates 
once again the multilateral nature of the adjustment problem, 
which to date has arguably been addressed with an excessive 
emphasis on just one facet: the US-China relationship. 
POLICY CHOICES
The authors of this brief draw the following policy implica-
tions:
•  With the US economy currently operating close to full 
employment, adjustment requires a rate of growth in US 
domestic demand below that of output over coming years 
to prevent inflationary excess demand. A prime candidate 
to facilitate this adjustment is fiscal contraction to offset 
the  increasing  contribution  to  growth  from  rising  US 
net exports. A rebalancing of world demand between the 
United States and East Asia is indispensable. 
•  Japan and China hold the key to the adjustment in Asia. 
Unless both Japanese and Chinese policymakers accept 
14. For four East Asian economies (Hong �ong, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Taiwan) and four European economies (Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
�ussia) with large current account surpluses, the combined weight in the 
Federal �eserve’s broad real exchange rate index for the dollar amounts to 
13.2 percent, higher than that of either China (11.3 percent) or Japan (10.5 
percent).
Table 2   Bilateral real exchange rate change against the US dollar consistent 
                   with  REER  movements in table 1 (percent change)
Author Japanese yen Chinese renminbi Euro
Martin Baily n.e. n.e. n.e.
Ray Barrell, Dawn Holland, 
and Ian Hurst
+ +18 +16
William R. Clinea +8 to +9 +1 to + +0
Thomas Stolper 
and Monica Fuentesb
+ +10 +1
Ronald MacDonald 
and Preèthike Dias
n.e. n.e. n.e.
Christopher Erceg n.e. n.e. n.e.
n.e. = not estimated 
REER = real effective exchange rate
a. See table 1, footnote a. 
b. Nominal exchange rates. Only results from the elasticity model reported.
Note: + implies appreciationN u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 4   m a r c h  2 0 0 7
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the appreciation of their currencies, it is difficult to see 
how the adjustment process can start in Asia as other 
Asian economies would in turn resist the appreciation of 
their currencies. Moreover, Japan has been at the fore-
front of promoting monetary integration in Asia. A Japan 
that is committed to cooperation on exchange rate policy 
in Asia should take the lead in the region on exchange rate 
adjustment against the dollar.
•  Now that the yen has begun to strengthen, it is impor-
tant that Japan not intervene to bail out speculators that 
engaged in the yen carry trade when the yen was very 
weak. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that the yen will 
appreciate further in the near term as the Bank of Japan 
continues its moves toward normalizing monetary policy. 
If not, there would be a case for intervention in foreign 
exchange markets to push the yen higher. In this regard, 
we note that on a real effective basis the yen is currently 
at its lowest level since 1986 and that it stands about 20 
percent below its average over the 20-year period since 
then. By comparison, when there was coordinated inter-
vention to boost the euro in late 2000, the real effective 
euro was 19 percent below its 20-year average.15 
•  In China, priority should be given to further eliminating 
distortions favoring exporting sectors and gearing macro-
economic  policy  toward  promoting  domestic  demand. 
Given the substantial real appreciation of the renminbi 
that is required, a step revaluation of the renminbi of, say, 
10 percent in the near term would seem appropriate. This 
move should be followed by further appreciation, with 
the aim, over a horizon of perhaps three to four years, of 
15.  Pre-1999 calculation uses the value of a synthetic euro based on the value 
of its legacy currencies. 
fully eliminating intervention designed to prevent appre-
ciation of the renminbi. 
•  In Europe, policymakers should not resist appreciation of 
the euro vis-à-vis the dollar so long as it happens in the 
context of global adjustment and does not imply effective 
euro appreciation. Otherwise if the Asian currencies were 
to appreciate against the dollar, then the real effective 
exchange rate of the euro would depreciate. If Europe is 
not to run a current account surplus, then the euro will 
have to strengthen vis-à-vis the dollar.
•  For the oil-exporting countries, evidence presented at the 
workshop by Brad Setser suggested that significant adjust-
ment is in the pipeline, with domestic absorption rising 
at a gradual pace. Therefore, it is not clear that further 
actions on their part are called for (assuming that the oil 
price does not increase again), other than to maintain the 
expansion of domestic spending.
In conclusion, policymakers should not wait until finan-
cial markets force global adjustment. The heightened volatil-
ity in international financial markets recently underscores the 
risks of an abrupt market-led adjustment if they fail to act. It 
is unlikely that the policymakers of each country will resolve 
independently to take actions that add up to a coherent pack-
age. There needs to be an international effort to persuade each 
country to contribute its fair share to a whole capable of bring-
ing about adjustment without interrupting world growth. In 
principle, the IMF’s multilateral surveillance exercise provides 
an ideal context for organizing such an international effort. 
The forthcoming spring meetings of the IMF will provide a 
crucial opportunity to assess progress made so far and move in 
earnest toward reaching agreement on an adjustment package 
along the lines sketched in this brief.
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